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One of the most elegant theories in economics is Hotelling’s (1931) characterization of the
price of an exhaustible natural resource. From the perspective of overall social welfare,
production today needs to be balanced against the consideration that, once consumed, the
resource will be unavailable to future generations. One option for society would be to
produce more of the commodity today, invest the current marginal beneﬁts net of extraction
costs in some other form of productive capital, and thereby accumulate beneﬁts over time at
the rate of interest earned on productive capital. An alternative is to save the resource so
it can be used in the future. Optimal use of the resource over time calls for equating these
two returns. This socially optimal plan could be implemented in a competitive equilibrium
if the price of the resource net of marginal production cost rises at the rate of interest. For
such a price path, the owner of the mine is just indiﬀerent between extracting a little bit
more of the resource today or leaving it in the ground to be exploited at higher proﬁti nt h e
future.
This theory is compelling and elegant, but very hard to reconcile with the observed
b e h a v i o ro fp r i c e so v e rt h eﬁrst century and a half of the oil industry. Figure 1 plots the
real price of crude petroleum since 1860. Oil has never been as costly as it was at the birth
of the industry. Prior to Edwin Drake’s ﬁrst oil well in Pennsylvania in 1859, people were
getting illuminants using very expensive methods.1 The term kerosene, which we still use
t o d a yt or e f e rt oar e ﬁned petroleum product, was actually a brand name used in the 1850s
for a liquid manufactured from asphalt or coal, a process which was then, as it still is now,
3quite expensive.2 Derrick’s Handbook (1898) reported that Drake had no trouble selling all
the oil his well could produce in 1859 at a price of $20/barrel. Given the 24-fold increase
in estimates of consumer prices since 1859, that would correspond to a price in 2010 dollars
a little below $500/barrel. As drillers producing the new-found “rock oil” from other wells
brought more of the product to the market, the price quickly fell, averaging $9.31/barrel for
1860 (the ﬁrst year shown in Figure 1). In 2010 prices, that corresponds to $232 a barrel,
still far above anything seen subsequently. Even ignoring the initial half-century of the
industry, the price of oil in real terms continued to drop from 1900 to 1970. And despite
episodes of higher prices in the 1970s and 2000s, throughout the period from 1992-1999, the
price of oil in real terms remained below the level reached in 1920.
There are two traditional explanations for why Hotelling’s theory appears to be at odds
with the long-run behavior of crude oil prices. The ﬁrst is that although oil is in principle
an exhaustible resource, in practice the supply has always been perceived to be so vast,
and the date at which it will ﬁnally be exhausted has been thought to be so far into the
future, that ﬁniteness of the resource had essentially no relevance for the current price. This
interpretation could be reconciled with the Hotelling solution if one hypothesizes a tiny rent
accruing to owners of the resource that indeed does grow at the rate of interest, but in
practice has always been suﬃciently small that the observed price is practically the same as
the marginal extraction cost.
A second eﬀort to save Hotelling’s theory appeals to the role of technological progress,
which could lower marginal extraction costs (e.g., Slade, 1982), lead to discovery of new ﬁelds
4(Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Arrow and Chang, 1982), or allow the exploitation of resources
previously thought not to be economically accessible (Pindyck, 1978). In generalizations of
the Hotelling formulation, these can give rise to episodes or long periods in which the real
price of oil is observed to fall, although eventually the price would begin to rise according to
these models. Krautkraemer (1998) has a nice survey of theories of this type and examination
of their empirical success at ﬁtting the observed data.
Although it can sometimes be helpful to think about technological progress in broad,
abstract terms, there is also much insight to be had from looking in some detail at the
speciﬁc factors that allowed global oil production to increase almost without interruption
over the last 150 years. For this purpose, I begin by examining some of the long-run trends
in U.S. oil production.
1.1 Oil production in the United States, 1859-2010.
Certainly the technology for extracting oil from beneath the earth’s surface has evolved
profoundly over time. Although Drake’s original well was steam-powered, some of the
early drills were driven through rock by foot power, such as the spring-pole method. The
workers would kick a heavy bit at the end of the rope down into the rock, and spring action
from the compressed pole would lift the bit back up. After some time at this, the drill
would be lifted out and a bucket lowered to bail out the debris. Of course subsequent
years produced rapid advances over these ﬁrst primitive eﬀorts— better sources of power,
improved casing technology, and vastly superior knowledge of where oil might be found.
5Other key innovations included the adoption of rotary drilling at the turn of the century,
in which circulating ﬂuid lifted debris out of the hole, and secondary recovery methods ﬁrst
developed in the 1920s, in which water, air, or gas is injected into oil wells to repressurize
the reservoir and allow more of the oil to be lifted to the surface.
Figure 2 plots the annual oil production levels for Pennsylvania and New York, where
the industry began, from 1862 to 2010. Production increased by a factor of 10 between
1862 and 1891. However, it is a mistake to view this as the result of application of better
technology to the initially exploited ﬁelds. Production from the original Oil Creek District
in fact peaked in 1874 (Williamson and Daum, 1959, p. 378). The production gains instead
came primarily from development of new ﬁelds, most importantly the Bradford ﬁeld near
the Pennsylvania-New York border, but also from Butler, Clarion, and Armstrong Counties.
Nevertheless, it is unquestionably the case that better drilling techniques than used in Oil
Creek were necessary in order to reach the greater depths of the Bradford formation.
One also sees quite clearly in Figure 2 the beneﬁts of the secondary recovery methods
applied in the 1920s, which succeeded in producing much additional oil from the Bradford
formation and elsewhere in the state. However, it is worth noting that these methods never
lifted production in Pennsylvania back to where it had been in 1891. In 2010— with the
truly awesome technological advances of the century and a half since the industry began,
and with the price of oil 5 times as high (in real terms) as it had been in 1891— Pennsylvania
and New York produced under 4 million barrels of crude oil. That’s only 12% of what had
been produced in 1891— 120 years ago— and about the level that the sturdy farmers with
6their spring-poles were getting out of the ground back in 1868.
Although Pennsylvania was the most important source of U.S. oil production in the
19th century, the nation’s oil production continued to increase even after Pennsylvanian
production peaked in 1891. The reason is that later in the century, new sources of oil were
also being obtained from neighboring West Virginia and Ohio (see Figure 3). Production
from these two states was rising rapidly even as production from Pennsylvania and New
York started to fall. Ohio production would continue to rise before peaking in 1896, and
West Virginia did not peak until 1900.
These four states together accounted for 90% of U.S. production in 1896, with the peak
in production from the region as a whole coming that year (see Figure 4). Overall U.S. pro-
duction declined for a few years with falling supplies from Appalachia, but quickly returned
to establishing new highs in 1900, thanks to growth in production from new areas in the
central United States, details of which are shown in Figure 5. Note the diﬀerence in scale,
with the vertical axes in Figure 5 spanning 6 times the magnitude of corresponding axes in
Figure 3. Each of the regions featured in Figure 5 would eventually produce far more oil
than Appalachia ever did. These areas began producing much later than Appalachia, and
each peaked much later than Appalachia. The combined production of Illinois and Indiana
peaked in 1940, Kansas-Nebraska in 1957, the southwest in 1960, and Wyoming in 1970.
Far more important for U.S. total production were the four states shown in Figure 6,
which uses a vertical scale 2.5 times that for Figure 5. California, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Louisiana account for 70% of all the oil ever produced in the United States. Production
7from Oklahoma reached a peak in 1927, though it was still able to produce at 80% of that
level as recently as 1970 before entering a modern phase of decline that now leaves it at 25%
of the 1927 production levels. Texas managed to grow its oil production until 1972, and
today produces about a third of what it did then. California production continued to grow
until 1985 before peaking. The graph for Louisiana (bottom panel of Figure 6) includes all
the U.S. production from the Gulf of Mexico, growing production from which helped bring
the state’s indicated production for 2010 up to a value only 33% below its peak in 1971.
Figure 7 plots production histories for the two regions whose development began latest
in U.S. history. Production from Alaska peaked in 1988. North Dakota is the only state
that continues to set all-time records for production, thanks in part to use of new drilling
techniques for recovering oil from shale formations. To put the new Williston Basin produc-
tion in perspective, the 138 million barrels produced in North Dakota and Montana in 2010
is about half of what the state of Oklahoma produced in 1927 and a ﬁfth of what the state
of Alaska produced in 1988. However, the potential for these ﬁelds looks very promising
and further signiﬁcant increases from 2010 levels seems assured.
The experience for the U.S. thus admits a quite clear summary. Production from every
state has followed a pattern of initial increase followed by eventual decline. The feature that
nonetheless allowed the total production for the U.S. to exhibit a seemingly uninterrupted
upward trend over the course of a century was the fact that new, more promising areas
were always coming into production at the same time that mature ﬁelds were dying out (see
Figure 8). Total U.S. production continued to grow before peaking in 1970, long after the
8original ﬁelds in Appalachia and the central U.S. were well into decline.
And the decline in production from both individual regions within the U.S. as well as
the United States as a whole has come despite phenomenal improvements in technology
over time. Production from the Gulf of Mexico has made a very important contribution
to slowing the rate of decline over the most recent decade. Some of this production today
is coming from wells that begin a mile below sea level and bore from there through up
to a half-dozen more miles of rock— try doing that with three guys kicking a spring-pole
down! The decline in U.S. production has further come despite aggressive drilling in very
challenging environments and widespread adoption of secondary and now tertiary recovery
methods. The rise and fall of production from individual states seems much more closely
related to discoveries of new ﬁelds and their eventual depletion than to the sorts of price
incentives or technological innovations on which economists are accustomed to focus.
Notwithstanding, technological improvements continue to bring signiﬁcant new ﬁelds
into play. The most important recent development has been horizontal rather than verti-
cal drilling through hydrocarbon-bearing formations accompanied by injection of ﬂuids to
induce small fractures in the rock. These methods have allowed access to hydrocarbons
trapped in rock whose permeability or depth prevented removal using traditional methods.
The new methods have enabled phenomenal increases in supplies of natural gas as well as
signiﬁcant new oil production in areas such as North Dakota and Texas. Wickstrom, et. al.
(2011) speculated that application of hydraulic fracturing to the Utica Shale formation in
Ohio might eventually produce several billion barrels of oil, which would be more than the
9cumulative production from the state up to this point. If that indeed turns out to be the
case, it could lead to a third peak in the graphs in Figure 3 for the Appalachian region that
exceeds either of the ﬁrst two, though for comparison the projected lifetime output from
Utica would still only correspond to a few years of production from Texas at that state’s
peak.
Obviously price incentives and technological innovations matter a great deal. More oil
will be brought to the surface at a price of $100 a barrel than at $10 a barrel, and more
oil can be produced with the new technology than with the old. But it seems a mistake
to overstate the operative elasticities. By 1960, the real price of oil had fallen to a level
that was 1/3 its value in 1900. Over the same period, U.S. production of crude oil grew
to become 55 times what it had been in 1900. On the other hand, the real price of oil
rose 8-fold from 1970 to 2010, while U.S. production of oil fell by 43% over those same 40
years. The increase in production from 1900 to 1960 thus could in no way be attributed
to the response to price incentives. Likewise, neither huge price incentives nor impressive
technological improvements were suﬃcient to prevent the decline in production from 1970 to
2010. Further exploitation of oﬀshore or deep shale resources may help put U.S. production
back on an upward trend for the next decade, but it seems unlikely ever again to reach the
levels seen in 1970.
101.2 World oil production, 1973-2010.
Despite the peak in U.S. production in 1970, world oil production was to grow to a level in
2010 that is 60% higher than it had been in 1970. The mechanics of this growth are the same
as allowed total U.S. production to continue to increase long after production from the initial
areas entered into decline— increases from new ﬁelds in other countries more than oﬀset the
declines from the United States. For example, the North Sea and Mexico accounted for
only 1% of world production in 1970, but had grown to 13% of total world output by 1999.
But production from the North Sea peaked in that year, and in 2010 is only at 54% of the
peak level (see Figure 9). Cantarell, which is Mexico’s main producing ﬁeld, also appears
to have passed peak production, with the country now at 75% of its 2004 oil production.
Production from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
must be interpreted from a much diﬀerent perspective. The episodes of declining production
one sees in the bottom panel of Figure 10 have little to do with geological depletion but
instead often reﬂect dramatic geopolitical events such as the OPEC embargo of 1973-74,
the Iranian revolution in 1978-1979, the Iranian revolution and beginning of the Iran-Iraq
War 1978-1981, and the ﬁrst Persian Gulf war in 1990-91, events that will be reviewed in
more detail in the following section. In addition, Saudi Arabia in particular (top panel) has
often made a deliberate decision to increase or decrease production in an eﬀort to mitigate
price increases or decreases. For example, Saudi Arabia cut production to try to hold up
prices during the weak oil market 1981-85 and recession of 2001, and boosted production
to make up for output lost from other producing countries during the two Persian Gulf
11wars. However, the decline in Saudi Arabian production since 2005 would have to be
attributed to diﬀerent considerations from those that explain the earlier historical data. The
kingdom’s magniﬁcent Ghawar ﬁeld has been in production since 1951, and in recent years
had accounted for perhaps 6% of total world production all by itself. There is considerable
speculation that Ghawar may have peaked, though this is diﬃcult to conﬁrm. What we do
know is that, for whatever reason, Saudi Arabia produced 600,000 fewer barrels each day in
2010 than it did in 2005, and with growing Saudi consumption of their own oil, the drop in
exports from Saudi Arabia has been even more dramatic.
A mix of factors has clearly also contributed to stagnating production from other OPEC
members over the last 5 years. Promising new ﬁelds in Angola have allowed that country
to double its production since 2003. In Nigeria and Iraq, conﬂicts and unrest have held
back what appears to be promising geological potential. In Venezuela and Iran, it is hard to
know how much more might be produced with better functioning governments. But again,
although there is a complicated mix of diﬀerent factors at work in diﬀerent countries, the
bottom line is that the total production from OPEC has essentially been ﬂat since 2005.
At the same time, some other countries continue to register increases in oil production
(see Figure 11). China has doubled its oil production since 1982, though its three most
important ﬁelds (Daqing, Shengli, and Liaohe) peaked in the mid 1990s (Kambara and
Howe, 2007). Canadian oil production continues to increase as a result of the contribution
of oil sands. Unfortunately, exploitation of this resource is far more costly in terms of
capital and energy inputs and environmental externalities relative to conventional sources,
12and it is diﬃcult to see it ever accounting for a major fraction of total world oil production.
Other regions such as Brazil, central Asia, and Africa have also seen signiﬁcant gains in oil
production (bottom panel of Figure 11). Overall, global production of oil from all sources
was essentially constant from 2005 to 2010 (see Figure 12).
1.3 Reconciling historical experience with the theory of exhaustible
resources.
The evidence from the preceding subsections can be summarized as follows. When one looks
at individual oil-producing regions, one does not see a pattern of continuing increases as a
result of ongoing technological progress. Instead there has inevitably been an initial gain as
key new ﬁelds were developed followed by subsequent decline. Technological progress and
the incentives of higher prices can temporarily reverse that decline, as was seen for example
in the impressive resurgence of Pennsylvanian production in the 1920s. In recent years these
same factors have allowed U.S. production to grow rather than decline, and that trend in the
U.S. may continue for some time. However, these factors have historically appeared to be
distinctly secondary to the broad reality that after a certain period of exploitation, annual
ﬂow rates of production from a given area are going to start to decline. Those encouraged
by the 10% increase in U.S. oil production between 2008 and 2010 should remember that
the level of U.S. production in 2010 is still 25% below where it had been in 1990 (when the
real price of oil was half of what it is today) and 43% below the level of 1970 (when the real
price of oil was 1/8 of what it is today).
13Some may argue that the peaking of production from individual areas is governed by quite
diﬀerent economic considerations than would apply to the ﬁnal peaking of total production
from all world sources combined. Certainly in an environment in which the market is pricing
oil as an essentially inexhaustible resource, the pattern of peaking documented extensively
above is perfectly understandable, given that so far there have always been enough new
ﬁelds somewhere in the world to take the place of declining production from mature regions.
One could also reason that, even if the price of oil has historically been following some
kind of Hotelling path, ﬁelds with diﬀerent marginal extraction costs would logically be
developed at diﬀerent times. Smith (2011) further noted that, according to the Hotelling
model, the date at which global production peaks would be determined endogenously by
the cumulative amount that could eventually be extracted and the projected time path
for the demand function. His analysis suggests that the date for an eventual peak in
global oil production should be determined by these economic considerations rather than
the engineering mechanics that have produced the historical record for individual regions
detailed above.
However, my reading of the historical evidence is as follows. (1) For much of the history
of the industry, oil has been priced essentially as if it were an inexhaustible resource. (2)
Although technological progress and enhanced recovery techniques can temporarily boost
production ﬂows from mature ﬁelds, it is not reasonable to view these factors as the primary
determinants of annual production rates from a given ﬁeld. (3) The historical source of
increasing global oil production is exploitation of new geographical areas, a process whose
14promise at the global level is obviously limited. The combined implication of these three
observations is that, at some point there will need to be a shift in how the price of oil is
determined, with considerations of resource exhaustion playing a bigger role than they have
historically.
A factor accelerating the date of that transition is the phenomenal growth of demand for
oil from the emerging economies. Eight emerging economies— Brazil, China, Hong Kong,
India, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand— accounted for 43% of the increase in
world petroleum consumption between 1998 and 2005 and for 135% of the increase between
2005 and 2010 (the rest of the world decreased its petroleum consumption over the latter
period in response to the big increase in price). 3 And, as Hamilton (2009a) noted, one could
easily imagine the growth in demand from the emerging economies continuing. One has
o n l yt oc o m p a r eC h i n a ’ so n ep a s s e n g e rv e h i c l ep e r3 0r e s i d e n t st o d a yw i t ht h eo n ev e h i c l e
per 1.3 residents seen in the United States, or China’s 2010 annual petroleum consumption
of 2.5 barrels per person with Mexico’s 6.7 or the United States’ 22.4. Even if the world sees
phenomenal success in ﬁnding new sources of oil over the next decade, it could prove quite
challenging to keep up with both depletion from mature ﬁelds and rapid growth in demand
from the emerging economies, another reason to conclude that the era in which petroleum
is regarded as an essentially unlimited resource has now ended.
Some might infer that the decrease in Saudi Arabian production since 2005 reﬂects not
an inability to maintain production ﬂows from the mature Ghawar ﬁe l db u ti n s t e a di sa
deliberate response to recognition of a growing importance of the scarcity rent. For example,
15Hamilton (2009a) noted the following story on April 13, 2008 from Reuters news service:
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah said he had ordered some new oil discoveries left
untapped to preserve oil wealth in the world’s top exporter for future generations,
the oﬃcial Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reported.
“I keep no secret from you that when there were some new ﬁnds, I told them,
‘no, leave it in the ground, with grace from God, our children need it’,” King
A b d u l l a hs a i di nr e m a r k sm a d el a t eo nS a t u r d a y ,S P As a i d .
If that is indeed the interpretation, it is curious that we would see the private optimizing
choices predicted by Hotelling manifest by sovereign governments rather than the ﬁelds under
control of private oil companies. In any case, it must be acknowledged that calculation of
the correct Hotelling price is almost insurmountably diﬃcult. It is hard enough for the best
forecasters accurately to predict supply and demand for the coming year. But the critical
calculation required by Hotelling is to evaluate the transversality condition that the resource
be exhausted when the price reaches that of a backstop technology or alternatively over the
inﬁn i t et i m eh o r i z o ni fn os u c hb a c k s t o pe x i s t s . T h a tc a l c u l a t i o ni so r d e r so fm a g n i t u d e s
more diﬃcult than the seemingly simpler task of just predicting next year’s supply and
demand.
One could argue that the combined decisions of the many participants in world oil markets
can make a better determination of what the answer to the above calculation should be than
can any individual, meaning that if the current price seems inconsistent with a scenario
in which global oil production will soon reach a peak, then such a scenario is perhaps not
16the most likely outcome. But saying that the implicit judgment from the market is the
best guess available is not the same thing as saying that this guess is going to prove to be
correct. The historical record surely dictates that we take seriously the possibility that
the world could soon reach a point from which a continuous decline in the annual ﬂow rate
of production could not be avoided, and inquire whether the transition to a pricing path
consistent with that reality could prove to be a fairly jarring event. For this reason, it seems
worthwhile to review the historical record on the economic response to previous episodes in
which the price or supply of oil changed dramatically, to which we now turn in the next
section.
2 Oil prices and economic growth.
2.1 Historical oil price shocks.
There have been a number of episodes over the last half century in which conﬂicts in the
Middle East have led to signiﬁcant disruptions in production of crude oil. These include
closure of the Suez Canal following the conﬂict between Egypt, Israel, Britain, and France
in October 1956, the oil embargo implemented by the Arab members of OPEC following the
Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, the Iranian revolution beginning in November 1978, the
Iran-Iraq War beginning in September of 1980, and the ﬁrst Persian Gulf war beginning in
August 1990. Figure 13 summarizes the consequences of these 5 events for world oil supplies.
In each panel, the solid line displays the drop in production from the aﬀected areas expressed
17as a percentage of total world production prior to the crisis. In each episode, there were
some oﬀsetting increases in production elsewhere in the world. The dashed lines in Figure
13 indicate the magnitude of the actual decline in total global production following each
event, again expressed as a fraction of world production. Each of these 5 episodes was
followed by a decrease in world oil production of 4-9%.
There have also been some other more minor supply disruptions over this period. These
include the combined eﬀects of the second Persian Gulf war and strikes in Venezuela be-
ginning in December 2002, and the Libyan revolution in February 2011. The disruption in
supply associated with either of these episodes was about 2% of total global production at
the time, or less than a third the size of the average event in Figure 13.
There are other episodes since World War II when the price of oil rose abruptly in the
absence of a signiﬁcant physical disruption in the supply of oil. Most notable of these would
be the broad upswing in the price of oil beginning in 2004, which accelerated sharply in
2007. The principal cause of this oil spike appears to have been strong demand for oil from
the emerging economies confronting the stagnating global production levels documented in
the previous sections (see Kilian, 2008, 2009, Hamilton, 2009b and Kilian and Hicks, 2011).
Less dramatic price increases followed the economic recovery from the East Asian Crisis
in 1997, dislocations associated with post World War II growth in 1947, and the Korean
conﬂict in 1952-53. Table 1 summarizes a series of historical episodes discussed in Hamilton
(forthcoming [b]). It is interesting that of the 11 episodes listed, 10 of these were followed
by a recession in the United States. The recession of 1960 is the only U.S. postwar recession
18that was not preceded by a spike in the price of crude oil.
A large empirical literature has investigated the connection between oil prices and real
economic growth. Early studies documenting a statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation
include Rasche and Tatom (1977, 1981) and Santini (1985). Empirical analysis of dynamic
forecasting regressions found that oil price changes could help improve forecasts of U.S. real
output growth (Hamilton, 1983; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986).
However, these speciﬁcations, which were based on linear relations between the log change in
oil prices and the log of real output growth, broke down when the dramatic oil price decreases
of the mid-1980s were not followed by an economic boom. On the contrary, the mid-1980s
appeared to be associated with recession conditions in the oil-producing states (Hamilton
and Owyang, forthcoming). Mork (1989) found a much better ﬁt to a model that allowed for
oil price decreases to have a diﬀerent eﬀect on the economy from oil price increases, though
Hooker (1996) demonstrated that this modiﬁcation still had trouble describing subsequent
data. Other papers ﬁnding a signiﬁcant connection between oil price increases and poor
economic performance include Santini (1992, 1994), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Daniel
(1997), and Carruth, Hooker and Oswald (1998).
Alternative nonlinear dynamic relations seem to have a signiﬁcantly better ﬁtt oU . S .
data than Mork’s simple asymmetric formulation. Loungani (1986) and Davis (1987a,
1987b) found that oil price decreases could actually reduce economic growth, consistent
with the claim that sectorial reallocations could be an important part of the economic
transmission mechanism resulting from changes in oil prices in either direction. Ferderer
19(1996), Elder and Serletis (2010), and Jo (2011) showed that an increase in oil price volatility
itself tends to predict slower GDP growth, while Lee, Ni, and Ratti (1995) found that oil
price increases seem to aﬀect the economy less if they occur following an episode of high
volatility. Hamilton (2003) estimated a ﬂexible nonlinear form and found evidence for a
threshold eﬀect, in which an oil price increase that simply reverses a previous decrease seems
to have little eﬀect on the economy. Hamilton (1996), Raymond and Rich (1997), Davis
and Haltiwanger (2001) and Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002) produced evidence in support
of related speciﬁcations, while Carlton (2010) and Ravazzolo and Rothman (2010) reported
that the Hamilton (2003) speciﬁcation performed well in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise
using data as it would have been available in real time. Kilian and Vigfusson (forthcoming
[a]) found weaker (though still statistically signiﬁcant) evidence of nonlinearity than reported
by other researchers. Hamilton (forthcoming [a]) attributed their weaker evidence to use of
a shorter data set and changes in speciﬁcation from other researchers.
An e g a t i v ee ﬀect of oil prices on real output has also been reported for a number of other
countries, particularly when nonlinear functional forms have been employed. Mork, Olsen
and Mysen (1994) found that oil price increases were followed by reductions in real GDP
growth in 6 of the 7 OECD countries investigated, the one exception being the oil exporter
Norway. Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003) found a negative correlation between oil prices
changes and industrial production growth rates in 13 out of 14 European economies, with
a nonlinear function of oil prices making a statistically signiﬁcant contribution to forecast
growth rates for 11 of these. Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) found a statistically
20signiﬁcant negative nonlinear relation between oil prices and real GDP growth in the U.S.,
Canada, Euro area overall, and 5 out of 6 European countries, though not in Norway or
Japan. Kim (forthcoming) found a nonlinear relation in a panel of 6 countries, while
Engemann, Kliesen, and Owyang (forthcoming) found that oil prices helped predict economic
recessions in most of the countries they investigated. Daniel, et. al. (2011) also found
supporting evidence in most of the 11 countries they studied. By contrast, Rasmussen and
Roitman (2011) found much less evidence for economic eﬀects of oil shocks in an analysis of
144 countries. However, their use of this larger sample of countries required using annual
rather than the monthly or quarterly data used in the other research cited above. Insofar
as the eﬀects are high frequency and cyclical, they may be less apparent in annual average
data. Kilian (2009) has argued that the source of the oil price increase is also important, with
increases that result from strong global demand appearing to have more benign implications
for U.S. real GDP growth than oil price increases that result from shortages of supply.
Blanchard and Galí (2010) found evidence that the eﬀects of oil shocks on the economy
have decreased over time, which they attributed to the absence of other adverse shocks that
had historically coincided with some big oil price movements, a falling value of the share
of oil in total expenses, more ﬂexible labor markets, and better management of monetary
policy. Baumeister and Peersman (2011) also found that an oil price increase of a given
size seems to have a decreasing eﬀect over time, but noted that the declining price-elasticity
of demand meant that a given physical disruption had a bigger eﬀect on price and turned
out to have a similar eﬀect on output as in the earlier data. Ramey and Vine (2012)
21attributed the declining coeﬃcients relating real GDP growth to oil prices to the fact that
the oil shocks of the 1970s were accompanied by rationing, which would have magniﬁed the
economic dislocations. Ramey and Vine found that once they correct for this, the economic
eﬀects have been fairly stable over time.
2.2 Interpreting the historical evidence.
The equation below reports the regression estimates from equation (3.8) of Hamilton (2003),
which is based on data from 1949:Q2 to 2001:Q3. Here yt represents the quarterly log
change in real GDP. The speciﬁcation implies that oil prices do not matter unless they
make a new high relative to values seen over the previous 3 years. If oil prices make a new
high, o
#
t is the amount by which the log of the producer price index at the end of quarter t
exceeds its maximum over the preceding 3 years, whereas o
#
t is zero if they do not. Standard
errors appear in parentheses, and both yt and o
#






























Two aspects of this relation are puzzling from the perspective of economic theory. First,
the eﬀects of an oil price increase take some time to show up in real GDP, with the biggest
drop in GDP growth appearing a full year after the price of oil ﬁrst increases. Second, the
size of the estimated eﬀect is quite large. If the price of oil exceeds its 3-year high by 10%,
the relation predicts that real GDP growth would be 0.42% slower (at a quarterly rate) 4
22quarters later, with a modest additional decline coming from the dynamic implications of
o
#
t−4 for yt−1,y t−2, and yt−3.
To understand why eﬀects of this magnitude are puzzling,4 s u p p o s ew et h o u g h to ft h e
l e v e lo fr e a lG D P(Y ) as depending on capital K, labor N, and energy E according to the
production function,
Y = F(K,N,E).





Multiplying the above equation by E/F implies that the elasticity of output with respect to








Suppose we thought that wages adjust instantaneously to maintain full employment and that
changes in investment take much longer than a few quarters to make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence











for θ the price-elasticity of energy demand.
23The energy expenditure share is a small number— the value of crude oil consumed by
the United States in 2010 corresponds to less than 4% of total GDP. Moreover, the short-
run price elasticity of demand θ is also very small (Dahl, 1993). Hence it seems that any
signiﬁcant observed response to historical oil price increases could not be attributed to the
direct eﬀects of decreased energy use on productivity, but instead would have to arise from
forces that lead to underemployment of labor and underutilization of capital. Such eﬀects
are likely to operate from changes in the composition of demand rather than the physical
process of production itself.5 Unlike the above mechanism based on aggregate supply eﬀects,
the demand eﬀects could be most signiﬁcant when the price-elasticity of demand is low.
For example, suppose that the demand for energy is completely inelastic in the short run,
so that consumers try to purchase the same physical quantity E of energy despite the energy
price increase. Then nominal saving or spending on other goods or services must decline
by E∆PE when the price of energy goes up. Letting C denote real consumption spending







for γC the energy expenditure share in total consumption. Again, for the aggregate economy
γC is a modest number. Currently about 6% of total U.S. consumer spending is devoted to
energy goods and services6, though for the lower 60% of U.S. households by income, the share
is closer to 10% (Carroll, 2011). And although the increased spending on energy represents
income for someone else, it can take a considerable amount of time for oil company proﬁts to
be translated into higher dividends for shareholders or increased investment expenditures.
24Recycling the receipts of oil exporting countries on increased spending on U.S.-produced
goods and services can take even longer. These delays may be quite important in determining
the overall level of spending that governs short-run business cycle dynamics.
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) conducted an extensive investigation of U.S. monthly spend-
ing patterns over 1970 to 2006, looking at bivariate autoregressions of measures of consump-
tion spending on their own lags and on lags of energy prices. They scaled the energy price
measure so that a one unit increase would correspond to a 1% drop in total consumption
spending if consumers were to try to maintain real energy purchases at their original levels.
Figure 14 reproduces some of their key results. The top panel shows that, as expected,
an increase in energy prices is followed by a decrease in overall real consumption spending.
However, the same two puzzles mentioned in connection with (1) occur again here. First,
although consumers’ spending power ﬁr s tf e l la td a t e0o nt h eg r a p h ,t h ed e c l i n ei nc o n -
sumption spending is not immediate but continues to increase in size up to a year after the
initial shock. Second, although the initial shock corresponded to an event that might have
forced a consumer to cut total spending by 1%, after 12 months, we see total spending down
2.2%.
The details of Edelstein’s and Kilian’s other analysis suggest some explanations for both
the dynamics and the apparent multiplier eﬀects. The second panel in Figure 14 looks
at one particular component of consumption spending, namely spending on motor vehicles
and parts. Here the decline is essentially immediate, and quite large relative to normal
expenditures on this particular category. The drop in demand for domestically manufactured
25motor vehicles could lead to idled capital and labor as a result of traditional Keynesian
frictions in adjusting wages and prices, and could be an explanation for both the multiplier
and the dynamics observed in the data. Hamilton (1988) showed that multiplier eﬀects
could also arise in a strictly neoclassical model with perfectly ﬂexible wages and prices. In
that model, the technological costs associated with trying to reallocate specialized labor
or capital could result in a temporary period of unemployment as laid-oﬀ workers wait for
demand for their sector to resume. Bresnahan and Ramey (1993), Hamilton (2009b), and
Ramey and Vine (2012) demonstrated the economic importance of shifts in motor vehicle
demand in the recessions that followed several historical oil shocks.
Another feature of the consumer response to an energy price increase uncovered by Edel-
stein and Kilian is a sharp and immediate drop in consumer sentiment (see the bottom panel
of Figure 14). Again, this could produce changes in spending patterns whose consequences
accumulate over time through Keynesian and other multiplier eﬀects.
Bohi (1989) was among the early doubters of the thesis that oil prices were an important
contributing factor in postwar recessions, noting that the industries in which one sees the
biggest response were not those for which energy represented the biggest component of total
costs. However, subsequent analyses allowing for nonlinearities found eﬀects for industries
for which energy costs were important both for their own production as well as for the
demand for their goods (Lee and Ni, 2002; Herrera, Lagalo and Wada, 2010).
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) suggested that another mechanism by which oil
price increases might have aﬀected aggregate demand is through a contractionary response
26of monetary policy. They presented simulations suggesting that , if the Federal Reserve had
kept interest rates from rising subsequent to historical oil shocks, most of the output decline
could have been avoided. However, Hamilton and Herrera (2004) demonstrated that this
conclusion resulted from the authors’ assumption that the eﬀects of oil price shocks could
be captured by 7 monthly lags of oil prices, a speciﬁcation that left out the biggest eﬀects
found by earlier researchers. When the Bernanke, et. al. analysis is reproduced using 12
lags instead of 7, the conclusion from their exercise would be that even quite extraordinarily
expansionary monetary policy could not have eliminated the contractionary eﬀects of an oil
price shock.
Hamilton (2009b) noted that what happened in the early stages of the 2007-2009 recession
was quite consistent with the pattern observed in the recessions that followed earlier oil
shocks. Spending on the larger domestically manufactured light vehicles plunged even as
sales of smaller imported cars went up. Had it not been for the lost production from
the domestic auto sector, U.S. real GDP would have grown 1.2% during the ﬁrst year of
the recession. Historical regressions based on energy prices would have predicted much of
the falling consumer sentiment and slower consumer spending during the ﬁrst year of the
downturn. Figure 15 updates and extends a calculation from Hamilton (2009b), in which
the speciﬁc parameter values from the historically estimated regression (1) were used in
a dynamic simulation to predict what would have happened to real GDP over the period
2007:Q4 to 2009:Q3 based solely on the changes in oil prices. The pattern and much of the
magnitude of the initial downturn are consistent with the historical experience.
27Of course, there is no question that the ﬁnancial crisis in the fall of 2008 was a much more
signiﬁcant event in turning what had been a modest slowdown up to that point into what
is now being referred to as the Great Recession. Even so, Hamilton (2009b) noted that the
magnitude of the problems with mortgage delinquencies could only have been aggravated by
the weaker economy, and suggested that the oil price spike of 2007-2008 should be counted
as an important factor contributing to the early stages of that recession as well as a number
of earlier episodes.
2.3 Implications for future economic growth and climate change.
The increases in world petroleum production over the ﬁrst 150 years of the industry have
been quite impressive. But given the details behind that growth, it would be prudent
to acknowledge the possibility that world production could soon peak or enter a period of
rocky plateau. If we should enter such an era, what does the observed economic response
to past historical oil supply disruptions and price increases suggest could be in store for the
economy?
The above analysis suggests that historically the biggest economic eﬀects have come from
cyclical factors that led to underutilization of labor and capital and drove output below the
level that would be associated with full employment. If we are asking about the character of
an alternative long-run growth path, most economists would be more comfortable assuming
that the economy would operate close to potential along the adjustment path. For purposes
of that question, the relatively small value for the energy expenditure share γ in equation
28(2) would seem to suggest a modest elasticity of total output with respect to energy use and
relatively minor eﬀects.
One detail worth noting, however, is that historically the energy share has changed
dramatically over time. Figure 16 plots the consumption expenditure share γC since 1959.
Precisely because demand is very price-inelastic in the short run, when the real price of
oil doubles, the share nearly does as well. The relatively low share in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, to which Blanchard and Galí (2010) attributed part of the apparent reduced
sensitivity of the economy to oil shocks, basically disappeared with the subsequent price
increases. If a peaking of global production does result in further big increases in the
price of oil, it is quite possible that the expenditure share would increase signiﬁcantly from
where it is now, in which case even a frictionless neoclassical model would conclude that the
economic consequences of reduced energy use would have to be signiﬁcant.
In addition to the response of supply to these price increases discussed in Section 1, an-
other key parameter is the long-run price-elasticity of demand. Here one might take comfort
from the observation that, given time, the adjustments of demand to the oil price increases
of the 1970s were signiﬁcant. For example, U.S. petroleum consumption declined 17% be-
tween 1978 and 1985 at the same time that U.S. real GDP increased by 21%. However,
Dargay and Gately (2010) attributed much of this conservation to one-time eﬀects, such as
switching away from using oil for electricity generation and space heating, that would be
diﬃcult to repeat on an ongoing basis. Knittel (forthcoming) was more optimistic, noting
that there has been ongoing technological improvement in engine and automobile design over
29time, with most of this historically being devoted to making cars larger and more powerful
rather than more fuel-eﬃcient. If the latter were to become everyone’s priority, signiﬁcant
reductions in oil consumption might come from this source.
Knowing what the future will bring in terms of adaptation of both the supply and demand
for petroleum is inherently diﬃcult. However, it is not nearly as hard to summarize the
past. Coping with a ﬁnal peak in world oil production could look pretty similar to what
we observed as the economy adapted to the production plateau encountered over 2005-2009.
That experience appeared to have much in common with previous historical episodes that
resulted from temporary geopolitical conﬂict, being associated with signiﬁcant declines in
employment and output. If the future decades look like the last 5 years, we are in for a
rough time.
Most economists view the economic growth of the last century and a half as being fueled
by ongoing technological progress. Without question, that progress has been most impres-
sive. But there may also have been an important component of luck in terms of ﬁnding
and exploiting a resource that was extremely valuable and useful but ultimately ﬁnite and
exhaustible. It is not clear how easy it will be to adapt to the end of that era of good
fortune.
Let me close with a few observations on the implications for climate change. Clearly
reduced consumption of petroleum by itself would mean lower greenhouse gas emissions.
Moreover, since GDP growth has historically been the single biggest factor inﬂuencing the
growth of emissions (Hamilton and Turton, 2002), the prospects for potentially rocky eco-
30nomic growth explored above would be another factor slowing growth of emissions. But
the key question in terms of climate impact is what we might do instead, since many of
the alternative sources of transportation fuel have a signiﬁcantly bigger carbon footprint
than those we relied on in the past. For example, creating a barrel of synthetic crude from
surface-mined Canadian oil sands may emit twice as much carbon dioxide equivalents as are
associated with producing a barrel of conventional crude, while in-situ processing of oil sands
could produce three times as much (Charpentier, Bergerson and MacLean, 2009). This is
not quite as alarming as it sounds, since greenhouse gas emissions associated with produc-
tion of the crude itself are still dwarfed by those released when the gasoline is combusted in
the end-use vehicle. The median study surveyed by Charpentier, Bergerson and MacLean
(2009) concluded that on a well-to-wheel basis, vehicles driven by gasoline produced from
surface-mined oil sands would emit 17% more grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilo-
meter driven compared to gasoline from conventional petroleum. Enhanced oil recovery
and conversion of natural gas to liquid fuels are also associated with higher greenhouse gas
emissions per kilometer driven than conventional petroleum, though these increases are more
modest than those for oil sands. On the other hand, creating liquid fuels from coal or oil
shale could increase well-to-wheel emissions by up to a factor of two (Brandt and Farrell,
2007).
In any case, if the question is whether the world should decrease combustion of gasoline
produced from conventional petroleum sources, we may not have any choice.
31Notes
1See Fouquet and Pearson (2006, 2012) on the history of the cost of illumination.
2See for example Williamson and Daum (1959, pp. 44-48).
3Data source: Total petroleum consumption, EIA (http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=5&aid=2&cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit=TBPD)
4The discussion in this paragraph is adapted from Hamilton (forthcoming [a]).
5Other neoclassical models explore the possibility of asymmetric or multiplier eﬀects
arising through utilization of capital (Finn, 2000) or putty-clay capital (Atkeson and Kehoe,
1999). Related general equilibrium investigations include Kim and Loungani (1992) and
Leduc and Sill (2004).
6See BEA Table 2.3.5.u (http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/nipa_underlying/SelectTable.asp).
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yes Iran-Iraq  War, 
controls lifted 
Jul 81 
none  Aug 90-Oct 90 
(93%) 
no  Gulf War I  Jul 90 
none  Dec 99-Nov 00 
(38%)  
no  strong demand  Mar 01 
none  Nov 02-Mar 03 
(28%)  
no Venezuela  unrest, 
Gulf War II 
none 
none  Feb 07-Jun 08 
(145%) 




Source: Hamilton (forthcoming [b]). 44 
 








Figure 1. Price of oil in 2010 dollars per barrel, 1860-2010.  Data source: 1861-2010 
from BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010; 1860 from Jenkins (1985, Table 18) 
(which appears to be the original source for the early values of the BP series) and 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Table E 135-166, Consumer Prices Indexes 
(BLS), All Items, 1800 to 1970. 45 
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Figure 2. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from the states of 
Pennsylvania and New York combined.  Data sources:  see Appendix.  46 
PA and NY






























Figure 3. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from the states of 
Pennsylvania and New York combined (top panel),  Ohio (middle panel), and West 













































































Figure 4. Combined annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from 
the states of Pennsylvania, New York,  West Virginia, and Ohio.48 
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CO, NM, AZ, and UT














Figure 5. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from assorted 
groups of states in the central United States.49 
CA





























Figure  6. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from 4 leading 
producing states.  California includes offshore and Louisiana includes all Gulf of Mexico 
U.S. production.50 
AK






















Figure 7. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from Alaska 





































































Figure 8. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per year) from entire 
United States, with contributions from individual regions as indicated.  52 
US
























Figure 9.  Annual crude oil production, thousand barrels per day, for United States, 
combined output of Norway and United Kingdom, and Mexico, 1973-2010.  Data source: 
Monthly Energy Review, Sept. 2011, Table 11.1b (http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/ 
data/monthly/query/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01B). 53 
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Figure 10.  Annual crude oil production, thousand barrels per day, for Saudi Arabia and 
the rest of OPEC.  Data source: Monthly Energy Review, Sept. 2011, Table 11.1a 
(http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/monthly/query/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01A). 54 
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Figure 11.  Annual crude oil production, thousand barrels per day.  Top two panels: 
China and Canada.  Bottom panel combines all non-OPEC countries other than those in 









































































Figure 12. Annual crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per day) from entire 
world, with contributions from individual regions as indicated.  Data sources described in 
notes to Figures 9-11. 56 
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Figure 13. First panel: Oil production after the Suez Crisis. Dashed line: change in 
monthly global crude oil production from October 1956 as a percentage of October 1956 
levels. Solid line: change in monthly Middle East oil production from October 1956 as a 
percentage of global levels in October 1956.  Second panel: Oil production after the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War. Dashed line: change in monthly global crude oil production from 
September 1973 as a percentage of September 1973 levels. Solid line: change in monthly 
oil production of Arab members of OPEC from September 1973 as a percentage of global 
levels in September 1973. Horizontal axis: number of months from September 1973.  
Third panel: Oil production after the 1978 Iranian revolution. Dashed line: change in 
monthly global crude oil production from October 1978 as a percentage of October 1978 
levels. Solid line: change in monthly Iranian oil production from October 1978 as a 
percentage of global levels in October 1978.  Fourth panel: Oil production after the Iran-
Iraq War. Dashed line: change in monthly global crude oil production from September 
1980 as a percentage of September 1980 levels. Solid line: change in monthly oil 
production of Iran and Iraq from September 1980 as a percentage of global levels in 
September 1980.  Fifth panel: Oil production after the first Persian Gulf War. Dashed 
line: change in monthly global crude oil production from August 1990 as a percentage of 
August 1990 levels. Solid line: change in monthly oil production of Iraq and Kuwait from 
August 1990 as a percentage of global levels in August 1990. Horizontal axis: number of 
months from August 1990.  Source: Adapted from Figures 6, 10, 12, 13, and 15 in 
Hamilton (forthcoming [b]). 57 
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Figure 14. Top panel: impulse-response function showing percentage change in total real 
consumption spending k months following an energy price increase that would have 
reduced spending power by 1%.  Second panel: percentage change in real spending on 
motor vehicles.  Bottom panel: change in consumer sentiment (measured in percentage 
points).  Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  Source: adapted from Edelstein 
and Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009b). 58 
 
Figure 15. Dashed line: actual value for real GDP. Green line: dynamic forecast (1- to 5-
quarters ahead) based on coefficients of univariate AR(4) estimated 1949:Q2 to 2001:Q3 
and applied to GDP data through 2007:Q3.  Red line: dynamic conditional forecast (1- to 
5-quarters ahead) based on coefficients reported in equation (3.8) in Hamilton (2003) 
using GDP data through 2007:Q3 and conditioning on the ex-post realizations of the net 
oil price increase measure 
#
ts o +  for t + s = 2007:Q4 through 2009:Q3.  Source: Foote and 
Little (2011). 59 







Figure 16. Energy expenditures as a fraction of total U.S. consumption spending.  
Calculated as 100 times nominal monthly consumption expenditures on energy goods and 
services divided by total personal consumption expenditures, 1959:M1 to 2011:M8.  





  State-level production data (in thousands of barrels per year) were assembled from the 
following sources: Derrick's Handbook (1898, p. 805); Minerals Yearbook, U.S. Department of 
Interior, various issues (1937, 1940, 1944, and 1948); Basic Petroleum Data Book, American 
Petroleum Institute, 1992; and Energy Information Administration online data set 
(http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm).  Numbers for Kansas for 1905 and 
1906 include Oklahoma.  The Basic Petroleum Data Book appears to allocate some Gulf of Mexico 
production to Texas but most to Louisiana.  The EIA series (which has been used here for data from 
1981 onward) does not allocate Federal offshore Gulf of Mexico to specific states, and has been 
attributed entirely to Louisiana in the table below.   61 
 
Year US  total  PA-NY WV  OH  IL-IN  CA KS-NE 
CO-NM-AZ-
UT TX LA OK  WY AK  ND-MT  Other 
1862 3,056 3,056 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1863 2,631 2,631 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1864 2,116 2,116 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1865 2,498 2,498 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1866 3,598 3,598 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1867 3,347 3,347 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1868 3,716 3,716 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 4,215 4,215 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 5,659 5,659 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1871 5,795 5,795 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1872 6,539 6,539 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1873 9,894 9,894 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1874 10,927 10,927 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1875 8,788 8,788 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1876 9,133 8,969 120 32  0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1877 13,350 13,135 172 30  0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1878 15,396 15,163 180 38  0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1879 19,914 19,685 180 29  0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1880 26,286 26,028 179 39  0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1881 27,662 27,377 151 34  0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1882 21,073 20,776 128 40  0 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1883 23,449 23,128 126 47  0 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1884 24,218 23,772 90 90  0 262 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
1885 21,859 20,776 91 662  0 325 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1886 28,065 25,798 102 1,783  0 377 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1887 28,283 22,356 145 5,023  0 678 0 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1888 27,612 16,489 119 10,011  0 690 0 298 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1889 35,163 21,487 544 12,472  34 303 1 317 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1890 45,824 28,458 493 16,125  65 307 1 369 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
1891 54,293 33,009 2,406 17,740  138 324 1 666 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
1892 50,515 28,422 3,810 16,363  699 385 5 824 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
1893 48,431 20,315 8,446 16,249  2,336 470 18 594 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
1894 49,344 19,020 8,577 16,792  3,689 706 40 516 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
1895 52,892 19,144 8,120 19,545  4,386 1,209 44 438 0 0 0 4 0 0 2
1896 60,960 20,584 10,020 23,941  4,681 1,253 114 361 1 0 0 3 0 0 2
1897 60,476 19,262 13,090 21,561  4,123 1,903 81 385 66 0 1 4 0 0 0
1898 55,367 15,948 13,618 18,739  3,731 2,257 72 444 546 0 0 6 0 0 6
1899 57,071 14,375 13,911 21,142  3,848 2,642 70 390 669 0 0 6 0 0 18
1900 63,621 14,559 16,196 22,363  4,874 4,325 75 317 836 0 6 6 0 0 64
1901 69,389 13,832 14,177 21,648  5,757 8,787 179 461 4,394 0 10 5 0 0 139
1902 88,767 13,184 13,513 21,014  7,481 13,984 332 397 18,084 549 37 6 0 0 186
1903 100,461 12,518 12,900 20,480  9,186 24,382 932 484 17,956 918 139 9 0 0 557
1904 117,081 12,239 12,645 18,877 11,339 29,649 4,251 501 22,241 2,959 1,367 12 0 0 1,001
1905 134,717 11,555 11,578 16,347 11,145 33,428 0 376 28,136 8,910 12,014 8 0 0 1,220
1906 126,494 11,500 10,121 14,788 12,071 33,099 0 328 12,568 9,077 21,718 7 0 0 1,217
1907 166,095 11,212 9,095 12,207 29,410 39,748 2,410 332 12,323 5,000 43,524 9 0 0 825
1908 178,527 10,584 9,523 10,859 36,969 44,855 1,801 380 11,207 5,789 45,799 18 0 0 74362 
1909 183,171 10,434 10,745 10,633 33,194 55,472 1,264 311 9,534 3,060 47,859 20 0 0 645
1910 209,557 9,849 11,753 9,916  35,303 73,011 1,128 240 8,899 6,841 52,029 115 0 0 473
1911 220,449 9,201 9,796 8,817  33,012 81,134 1,279 227 9,526 10,721 56,069 187 0 0 480
1912 222,935 8,712 12,129 8,969  29,572 87,269 1,593 206 11,735 9,263 51,427 1,572 0 0 488
1913 248,446 8,865 11,567 8,781  24,850 97,788 2,375 189 15,010 12,499 63,579 2,407 0 0 536
1914 265,763 9,109 9,680 8,536  23,256 99,775 3,104 223 20,068 14,309 73,632 3,560 0 0 511
1915 281,104 8,726 9,265 7,825  19,918 86,592 2,823 208 24,943 18,192 97,915 4,246 0 0 451
1916 300,767 8,467 8,731 7,744  18,483 90,952 8,738 197 27,645 15,248 107,072 6,234 0 45 1,211
1917 335,316 8,613 8,379 7,751  16,537 93,878 36,536 121 32,413 11,392 107,508 8,978 0 100 3,110
1918 355,928 8,217 7,867 7,285  14,244 97,532 45,451 143 38,750 16,043 103,347 12,596 0 69 4,384
1919 378,367 8,988 8,327 7,736  12,932 101,183 33,048 121 79,366 17,188 86,911 13,172 0 90 9,305
1920 442,929 8,344 8,249 7,400  11,719 103,377 39,005 111 96,868 35,714 106,206 16,831 0 340 8,765
1921 472,183 8,406 7,822 7,335  11,201 112,600 36,456 108 106,166 27,103 114,634 19,333 0 1,509 19,510
1922 557,530 8,425 7,021 6,781  10,470 138,468 31,766 97 118,684 35,376 149,571 26,715 0 2,449 21,707
1923 732,407 8,859 6,358 7,085 9,750 262,876 28,250 86 131,023 24,919 160,929 44,785 0 2,782 44,705
1924 713,940 8,926 5,920 6,811 9,016 228,933 28,836 543 134,522 21,124 173,538 39,498 0 2,815 53,458
1925 763,743 9,792 5,763 7,212 8,692 232,492 38,357 2,286 144,648 20,272 176,768 29,173 0 4,091 84,197
1926 770,874 10,917 5,946 7,272  8,568 224,673 41,498 4,434 166,916 23,201 179,195 25,776 0 7,727 64,751
1927 901,129 11,768 6,023 7,593  7,846 231,196 41,069 4,057 217,389 22,818 277,775 21,307 0 5,058 47,230
1928 901,474 12,559 5,661 7,015  7,514 231,811 38,596 3,717 257,320 21,847 249,857 21,461 0 4,015 40,101
1929 1,007,323 15,197 5,574 6,743  7,300 292,534 42,813 4,188 296,876 20,554 255,004 19,314 0 3,980 37,246
1930 898,011 16,450 5,071 6,486  6,730 227,329 41,638 11,845 290,457 23,272 216,486 17,868 0 3,349 31,030
1931 851,081 15,255 4,472 5,327  5,879 188,830 37,018 16,772 332,437 21,804 180,574 14,834 0 2,830 25,049
1932 785,159 15,920 3,876 4,644  5,479 178,128 34,848 13,591 312,478 21,807 153,244 13,418 0 2,457 25,269
1933 905,656 15,805 3,815 4,235  4,981 172,010 41,976 15,035 402,609 25,168 182,251 11,227 0 2,273 24,271
1934 908,065 18,282 4,095 4,234  5,317 174,305 46,482 18,003 381,516 32,869 180,107 12,556 0 3,603 26,696
1935 996,596 20,046 3,902 4,082  5,099 207,832 54,843 22,043 392,666 50,330 185,288 13,755 0 4,603 32,107
1936 1,099,687 21,733 3,847 3,847  5,297 214,773 58,317 28,873 427,411 80,491 206,555 14,582 0 5,868 28,093
1937 1,279,160 24,667 3,845 3,559  8,343 238,521 70,761 40,459 510,318 90,924 228,839 19,166 0 5,805 33,953
1938 1,214,355 22,471 3,684 3,298 25,070 249,749 60,064 37,171 475,850 95,208 174,994 19,022 0 4,946 42,828
1939 1,264,962 22,480 3,580 3,156 96,623 224,354 60,703 39,041 483,528 93,646 159,913 21,454 0 5,960 50,524
1940 1,353,214 22,352 3,444 3,159  152,625 223,881 66,415 40,755 493,209 103,584 156,164 25,711 0 6,728 55,187
1941 1,402,228 21,935 3,433 3,510  139,804 230,263 85,140 41,719 505,572 115,908 154,702 29,878 0 7,526 62,838
1942 1,386,645 23,200 3,574 3,543  113,134 248,326 98,873 33,743 483,097 115,785 140,690 32,812 0 8,074 81,794
1943 1,505,613 20,816 3,349 3,322 87,543 284,188 106,813 41,216 594,343 123,592 123,152 34,253 0 7,916 75,110
1944 1,677,904 18,815 3,070 2,937 82,531 311,793 99,179 42,638 746,699 129,645 124,616 33,356 0 8,647 73,978
1945 1,713,665 17,163 2,879 2,838 79,962 326,482 96,720 42,387 754,710 131,051 139,299 36,219 0 8,420 75,535
1946 1,733,909 17,829 2,929 2,908 82,023 314,713 97,511 48,670 760,215 143,669 134,794 38,977 0 8,825 80,846
1947 1,856,987 17,452 2,617 3,108 72,554 333,132 105,361 56,628 820,210 160,128 141,019 44,772 0 8,742 91,264
1948 2,020,185 17,288 2,692 3,600 71,782 340,074 111,123 65,847 903,498 181,458 154,455 55,032 0 9,382 103,954
1949 1,841,940 15,799 2,839 3,483 74,197 332,942 102,198 71,869 744,834 190,826 151,660 47,890 0 9,118 94,285
1950 1,973,574 16,002 2,808 3,383 72,727 327,607 109,133 71,898 829,874 208,965 164,599 61,631 0 8,109 96,838
1951 2,247,711 15,599 2,757 3,140 71,343 354,561 117,080 81,847 1,010,270 232,281 186,869 68,929 0 8,983 94,052
1952 2,289,836 15,475 2,602 3,350 72,126 359,450 117,467 90,799 1,022,139 243,929 190,435 68,074 0 11,155 92,835
1953 2,357,082 14,449 3,038 3,610 71,849 365,085 120,910 108,650 1,019,164 256,632 202,570 82,618 0 17,103 91,404
1954 2,314,988 12,364 2,902 3,880 78,002 355,865 127,100 122,931 974,275 246,558 185,851 93,533 0 20,220 91,507
1955 2,484,428 11,435 2,320 4,353 92,411 354,812 132,872 137,838 1,053,297 271,010 202,817 99,483 0 26,797 94,983
1956 2,617,283 10,978 2,179 4,785 93,859 350,754 140,408 148,875 1,107,808 299,421 215,862 104,830 0 35,255 102,269
1957 2,616,901 10,856 2,215 5,478 89,745 339,646 143,200 154,108 1,073,867 329,896 214,661 109,584 0 40,431 103,21463 
1958 2,448,987 8,235 2,186 6,260  92,139 313,672 140,315 172,074 940,166 313,891 200,699 115,572 0 42,216 101,562
1959 2,574,600 8,140 2,184 5,978  88,281 308,946 142,424 192,116 971,978 362,666 198,090 126,050 187 47,681 119,879
1960 2,574,933 7,822 2,300 5,405  89,395 305,352 137,278 192,516 927,479 400,832 192,913 133,910 559 52,232 126,940
1961 2,621,758 7,301 2,760 5,639  88,318 299,609 136,610 192,503 939,191 424,962 193,081 141,937 6,327 54,558 128,962
1962 2,676,189 6,891 3,470 5,835  90,873 296,590 136,970 182,873 943,328 477,153 202,732 135,847 10,259 56,829 126,539
1963 2,752,723 6,762 3,350 6,039  86,698 300,908 130,953 181,727 977,835 515,057 201,962 144,407 10,740 55,900 130,385
1964 2,786,822 6,987 3,370 15,859  81,451 300,009 125,365 177,257 989,525 549,698 202,524 138,752 11,059 56,378 128,588
1965 2,848,514 6,554 3,530 12,908  75,189 316,428 121,949 178,072 1,000,749 594,853 203,441 138,314 11,128 59,128 126,271
1966 3,027,762 6,072 3,674 10,899  72,278 345,295 117,588 181,889 1,057,706 674,318 224,839 134,470 14,358 62,506 121,870
1967 3,215,742 6,359 3,561 9,924  69,223 359,219 112,573 187,021 1,119,962 774,527 230,749 136,312 29,126 60,274 116,912
1968 3,329,042 5,692 3,312 11,204  65,083 375,496 107,688 187,361 1,133,380 817,426 223,623 144,250 66,204 73,500 114,823
1969 3,371,751 5,704 3,104 10,972  58,565 375,291 100,822 183,249 1,151,775 844,603 224,729 154,945 73,953 66,657 117,382
1970 3,517,450 5,287 3,124 9,864  51,234 372,191 96,304 178,061 1,249,697 906,907 223,574 160,345 83,616 59,877 117,369
1971 3,453,914 4,924 2,969 8,286  45,742 358,484 88,594 170,669 1,222,926 935,243 213,313 148,114 79,494 56,252 118,904
1972 3,455,369 4,459 2,677 9,358  41,004 347,022 82,449 170,103 1,301,686 891,827 207,633 140,011 72,893 54,528 129,719
1973 3,360,903 4,249 2,385 8,796  35,981 336,075 73,467 171,036 1,294,671 831,524 191,204 141,914 72,323 54,855 142,423
1974 3,202,585 4,374 2,665 9,088  32,472 323,003 68,302 176,306 1,262,126 737,324 177,785 139,997 70,603 54,251 144,289
1975 3,056,779 4,139 2,479 9,578  30,699 322,199 65,226 176,088 1,221,929 650,840 163,123 135,943 69,834 53,296 151,406
1976 2,976,180 3,876 2,519 9,994  30,902 326,021 64,896 165,945 1,189,523 606,501 161,426 134,149 63,398 54,539 162,491
1977 3,009,265 3,539 2,518 10,359  30,922 349,609 63,464 160,223 1,137,880 562,905 156,382 136,472 169,201 55,953 169,838
1978 3,178,216 3,739 2,382 11,154  28,051 347,181 62,448 151,948 1,074,050 532,740 150,456 137,385 448,620 55,279 172,783
1979 3,121,310 3,729 2,406 11,953  26,508 352,268 63,063 140,173 1,018,094 489,687 143,642 131,890 511,335 60,871 165,691
1980 3,146,365 3,475 2,336 12,928  27,680 356,923 66,391 130,510 977,436 469,141 150,140 126,362 591,646 69,921 161,476
1981 3,128,624 4,570 3,473 13,551  28,811 384,958 72,481 128,088 932,350 462,097 154,056 130,563 587,337 76,237 150,052
1982 3,156,715 5,116 3,227 14,571  33,273 401,572 77,397 124,344 908,217 475,474 158,621 118,300 618,910 78,192 139,501
1983 3,170,999 5,113 3,628 14,971  34,521 404,688 77,974 133,990 882,911 499,334 158,604 118,303 625,527 79,915 131,520
1984 3,249,696 5,124 3,524 15,271  34,394 412,020 82,181 143,085 883,174 536,868 168,385 124,269 630,401 82,413 128,587
1985 3,274,553 5,922 3,555 14,988  35,433 423,877 82,350 149,743 869,218 527,852 162,739 128,514 666,233 80,625 123,504
1986 3,168,252 4,636 3,145 13,442  32,004 406,665 74,132 144,354 819,595 532,119 149,105 121,337 681,310 72,700 113,708
1987 3,047,378 4,012 2,835 12,153  27,718 395,698 65,975 137,049 760,962 500,544 134,378 115,267 715,955 66,410 108,422
1988 2,979,126 3,396 2,621 11,711  26,141 386,014 64,802 136,718 735,495 464,466 128,874 113,985 738,143 62,681 104,079
1989 2,778,771 3,196 2,243 10,215  23,689 364,250 61,715 127,921 688,169 432,222 117,493 107,715 683,979 57,700 98,264
1990 2,684,679 3,056 2,143 10,008  22,954 350,899 61,317 125,428 678,478 417,386 112,273 103,856 647,309 56,527 93,045
1991 2,707,043 2,958 1,963 9,156  22,082 351,016 62,760 126,377 682,616 438,825 108,094 99,928 656,349 55,470 89,449
1992 2,624,631 2,541 2,068 9,197  22,319 348,040 59,087 122,573 650,623 443,984 101,807 96,810 627,322 51,376 86,884
1993 2,499,044 2,371 2,048 8,282  20,167 343,729 54,493 119,714 619,090 439,791 96,625 87,667 577,495 48,363 79,209
1994 2,431,483 2,817 1,918 8,758  19,640 343,569 50,948 115,185 590,735 440,306 90,973 79,528 568,951 44,103 74,052
1995 2,394,268 2,243 1,948 8,258  18,968 350,686 47,560 112,544 559,646 467,203 87,490 78,884 541,654 45,865 71,319
1996 2,366,021 2,001 1,680 8,305  18,098 346,828 45,330 108,917 543,342 505,795 85,379 73,365 509,999 48,236 68,746
1997 2,354,832 1,597 1,509 8,593  18,545 339,307 43,172 114,850 536,584 546,302 83,364 70,176 472,949 51,358 66,526
1998 2,281,921 2,197 1,471 6,541  15,940 329,860 38,715 113,969 504,662 582,608 77,578 64,782 428,850 52,045 62,703
1999 2,146,726 1,677 1,471 5,970  14,029 312,719 31,709 99,164 449,233 614,072 70,556 61,126 383,199 47,819 53,982
2000 2,130,720 1,710 1,400 6,575  14,304 306,124 37,420 101,374 443,397 628,675 69,976 60,726 355,199 48,147 55,693
2001 2,117,521 1,786 1,226 6,051  12,114 291,766 36,864 99,832 424,297 665,095 68,531 57,433 351,411 47,611 53,504
2002 2,097,121 2,398 1,382 6,004  14,013 287,793 35,500 98,514 411,985 661,287 66,642 54,717 359,335 47,848 49,703
2003 2,073,454 2,569 1,334 5,647  13,561 280,000 36,699 100,382 405,801 659,242 65,356 52,407 355,582 48,726 46,148
2004 1,983,300 2,708 1,339 5,785  12,739 267,260 36,365 101,014 392,867 615,311 62,502 51,619 332,465 55,878 45,448
2005 1,890,105 4,144 1,563 5,652  11,934 256,848 36,236 100,184 387,680 543,259 62,142 51,626 315,420 68,515 44,902
2006 1,862,259 3,945 1,749 5,422  12,054 249,562 37,964 101,173 397,220 547,876 62,841 52,904 270,486 76,173 42,89064 
2007 1,848,452 4,033 1,574 5,455  11,336 241,378 38,824 101,631 396,894 542,763 60,952 54,130 263,595 79,887 46,000
2008 1,811,819 3,997 1,593 5,715  11,281 238,691 41,976 105,507 398,014 494,708 64,065 52,943 249,874 94,321 49,134
2009 1,956,597 3,880 1,864 5,834  10,903 228,994 41,703 112,443 403,797 638,004 67,018 51,333 235,500 107,428 47,896
2010 1,998,138 3,923 1,992 4,785  10,901 223,501 42,672 120,583 426,700 633,639 69,513 53,133 218,762 138,341 49,693
 